Introduction
The focus of corporate governance mechanisms has traditionally prioritised the maximizing of shareholders economic value (Freidman, 1962; Williamson, 1975; Kakabadse et al., 2013) more than environmental protection and social sustainability. Within the originating economies of Anglo-American capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Aguliera and Crespi-Cladera, 2015) progressive governments' increasingly neo-liberal financial policies (Kinderman, 2012; Heyes et al., 2012) as innovations, have supported the rapid growth of an elite cadre of corporate entities (Vitali et al., 2011) . Concern about the management of finite world resources by these leading firms and their impact on societies is driving the sustainable development trajectory (WCED, 1987; Casula Vifell and Soneryd, 2012) through greater prominence of discretionary firm corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities (Carroll, 1991) . This broadens the fiercely contested debates concerning managerial discretion (Berle and Means, 1932) and monitoring by owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) researched within and across academic, economic, behavioural, environmental and legal fields to integrate environmental and social well-being decision-making as sustainable development accountability of the firm.
Regardless, the intensifying regularity of corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, Lehmans, BP, Barclays, VW, Rolls Royce, Tesco (Filho and Balassiano, 2008; Neal and Cochran, 2008, Utz, 2017) has impacted governments that are out of kilter(Ireland, Greece, Spain)and firm control within industries (Knyght et al., 2011, Martínez-Ferrero, and Frías-Aceituno, 2015) . In advanced stable economies, the governance attention has shifted towards maturing environmental (E.U. Emission trading scheme,2005;EPI, 2014) and social indices (FTSE4Good, 2001 ;Dow Jones sustainability index, 1999). As such, corporate performance (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; AlNajjar, and Anfimiadou, 2012 ) is these days, a more valued outcome of CSR activities (Carroll, 1999; Amran, Lee, and Devi,2014; Calza, Profuma and Tutore, 2016) which are the critical focus of mature boards' sustainability priorities (Helfaya, and Moussa,. 2017; Kakabadse et al., 2009; Khan and Kakabadse 2014) .
Some studies have examined the relationship of CSR with firm financial (Margolis and Walsh, 2003) and social performance (Rehbein, Waddock and Graves, 2004) or towards its assessment in a national context (Skouloudis and Evangelinos, 2012) . These elements are of equal importance because businesses exist in and are inter-dependent on society. (McKelvey, 1999) .
As such, CSR constructs have to equitably promote environmental, social and economic issues for better sustainability judgements and outcomes (Bondy et al., 2012) . We note here, a distinction to environment and social issues being understood for firm financial performance! Our contribution tries to be sensitive to how each firm uniquely embeds CSR as equitable construct and to the influence a national context can have on them (Killic et al. 2015) .
More particularly, the existing research into firm ownership and CSR is relatively sparse (Cormier and Gordon, 2001) . Few studies have examined the relationship of firm ownership structure with specific elements e.g. climate change mitigation (Amran et al., 2014) . In advanced markets, institutional ownership influence dominates the leading listed firms. Some scholars assert that dominant institutional owners focus their attention on shorter term goals, that often disregard CSR as a longer term goal (Coffey and Frixell, 1991) . Other scholars argue institutional investors are unable to leave the firm early and therefore, they prioritise mitigation of risk and stronger compliance or disclosure (Neubam and Zahra, 2006) . Our contribution is novel in how we integrate the equitable factors that define CSR and uniquely draw attention to Page 4 of 41 voluntary board behaviours (CEO/non-CEO) as complimentary, yet critical to mandatory compliance (Arora and Dharwadkha, 2011) for listed firms, which is pronounced during austerity conditions. This paper contributes to a research gap examining CSR and firm ownership under emergent austerity conditions. The focus is on understanding how ownership structure influences the decision to invest in CSR activities (Prado-Lorenzo et al.,2009; Oh et al., 2011; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; Ali, Frynas and Mahmood, 2017; Lopatta, Jaeschke and Chen, 2017) by U.K.
based corporations, where CEO and non-CEO CSR behaviour is voluntary.
The remainder of the paper proceeds by outlining the critical literature streams of voluntary and mandatory CSR, before sharing the conceptual model and proposition development. This is followed by the methodological approach, inclusive of sample selection and CSR construct as independent, dependent and control variables. In the latter sections of this paper, the findings, discussion and conclusion focus on enabling ownership conditions for enhancing voluntary CSR activities for improving sustainable development. Towards the end of the paper, the limitations of the study and need for future research are also shared.
CSR as mandatory and voluntary theoretical construct
Whilst CSR as aboard agenda is influenced by ownership structure (Ciulla, 1999; Weaver et al., 1999; Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2015; Galbreath,2017) its relationship as a corporate governance mechanism influencing board performance remains ambiguous. Former research (Kesner and Johnson, 1990; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999) has commonly examined different variable mechanism implications simultaneously (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) and in isolation i.e. non-executive directors' ownership; executive directors' Page 5 of 41 ownership; institutional ownership etc. Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) argue that interdependence among various corporate governance mechanisms (Rediker and Seth, 1995) is itself one of the grounds for this ambiguity. Arora and Dharwadkhar (2011) , where the development of these constructs can be understood over time:
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
In Table 1 above, the earlier conceptualisations of CSR emphasised the voluntary obligations of executives to behave and reflect the acceptable values of society, as a condition of their professional legitimacy. Meanwhile, the institutional concern supported growth of corporations, whereas economics dominated the rhetoric of ethics. In the1980s, the weakening of CSR as a stakeholder concern represented a transition towards greater emphasis on institutional intervention and State responsibility i.e. mandatory. By the 1990s, CSR had become a collection of different performance measures that clearly differentiated between the mandatory and voluntary concerns, but in an internationalising marketplace. In the twentieth century, a rise of interconnected social and environmental priorities has focused attention on discrete features between ownership (institution, board, individual shareholder) and managerial demands of the extended supply chains and the local impact of business, relative to national and industry regulations, or the lack of them. What emerges in the second decade of 21st century is CSR as having different combinations of mandatory and voluntary (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Lund-Thomsen, P. and Nadvi, K., 2010) meanings to the advanced Page 6 of 41 (monitoring and institutional led) and developing (protecting the power base whilst reforming towards advanced nation demands) markets. As such, this study is located amidst pressures of globalisation (Kakabadse and Khan, 2016) in which governments are weakened and corporations are able to more choose where and how they operate (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007: 1101).
The growing consensus followed here, is that voluntary (sustainable development practices; committed employment; philanthropy) and mandatory (meeting of minimum regulations; health and safety; human rights) CSR is better examined separately (Strike et al., 2006; Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Godfrey et al., 2009; Chiu and Sharfman, 2009; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) .Furthermore, where 'firms cannot be trusted to behave completely ethically on their own' (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011: 14) , this study contributes to a gap in the field, in understanding the impact of corporate ownership structures, particularly on the board (Galbreath, 2017) as CEO and non-CEO prompts and prevention, as influential on voluntary CSR.
Typically, profit-focused corporations are more likely to engage in voluntary CSR when they perform economically well (O'Rourke, 2003, Waddock and Graves, 1997) .In this study, firm performance is incorporated into the conceptual model, as attainment discrepancy and organisational slack 1 , underpinned by the behavioural theory of the firm 2 (Cyert and March, 1963; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) .Attainment discrepancy is the difference between actual and desired performance 3 . It is suggested that when a corporate firm is perceived to be 1 For literature threads to Attainment and Organisational Slack see Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) Appendix 1 pg14.
2
Most decisions concerning long-term investments within organizations, including voluntary corporate social programmes, are subject to unresolved conflict between coalition of stakeholders (Cyert and March, 1963 (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) .
A little closer to reality, the voluntary CSR lens associates effective governance with a greater degree of uncertainty where investment interest and potential benefit is preferred by those with a longer-term horizon (Jamali et al., 2008) . When governance mechanisms focus on short term performance e.g. institutional owners demand short term returns (Neubaum and Zahra, 1996 4 ), this conflicts with and prevents managerial voluntary CSR investment options (Bushee, 1998) .
The institutional owner may be perceived as passive (Pound, 1992; Wahal, 1996; Edwards and Hubbard, 2000) or having an agenda that determines value as part of a diversified portfolio (Dharwadkar et al., 2008) (Neubaum and Zahra, 1996; Porter and Kramer 2006, 2011) ,the criteria of our Considering the board, a greater number of Non-CEOs are associated with an attention to and legitimacy within, the external marketplace (Pfeffer and Salancik,1978) . But where the majority owners in our sample are institutional investors (Oh et al., 2011) In this study, corporate board structure includes managerial ownership. Although CEO tenure and incentivisation (Rajan and Zingales,2000; Kakabadse et al., 2001) ,such as share options and bonus schemes (Core, et al., 2001; Murphy, 1999) has received much scholarly (Florakis and Balafas, 2014) A major literature stream asserts that compensation serves for executive alignment with longer term shareholder interests (Gabaix and Landier 2008 , Kaplan, 2008 , Kaplan and Rauh, 2010 .
Others argue that managerial power may complicate the agency problem (Yermack, 1997 , Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 , Bebchuk and Fried, 2003 . Past performance has been understood as signalling CEO ability, whilst in the post financial crisis (2008) era, the focus has been on tying executive share option schemes to the longer term future growth of the firm (Grout and Zalewska, 2012) .Where management act in opposition to their shareholders (Shleifer and Vishney, 1997) self-interest and shorter-time horizons can adversely affect voluntary CSR (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) . We propose CEO ownership has a negative impact on voluntary CSR.
Proposition P3: Increase in CEO ownership stake in the firm is negatively associated with voluntary CSR.
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Satisfaction with firm performance
In this study both features of BTOF (Cyert and March, 1963) shareholders are likely to repose greater trust in management's decisions and permit higher discretion in financial allocation for longer term investment (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) .
Contrastingly, in the case of negative attainment discrepancy, governance will focus on improving performance by cutting corners, including CSR investment or cost reduction. This leads to limitation of managerial discretion as shareholding owners are not satisfied with their decision making (Bromiley et al., 2001) .Therefore, we propose that positive attainment discrepancy is positively associated with voluntary CSR.
Proposition P4: High attainment discrepancy is positively associated with voluntary CSR.
Organizational slack is able to signify the existence of actual and potential resources which are needed for internal and external necessities for strategic development (Bourgeois, 1981) . This availability enables organizations to commit to social causes (Waddock and Graves, 1997) as well as to respond to stakeholders' demands (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) .
Some researchers (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Amato and Amato, 2007) have used financial performance as a proxy for organisational slack to examine CSR's level of engagement. This has resulted in contradictory findings (Nohria and Gulati, 1996) and is unclear as performance (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) . It is recommended to distinguish between high (uncommitted liquid funds) and low discretion (absorbed costs) constituents of slack (Navarro, 1988; Seifert et al., 2004; Arora, 2008; Arora and Dharwadkhar, 2011) where only high discretionary slack (Potential) should be used in investigating CSR, as absorbed costs are harder / unlikely to be recoverable. Navarro, 1988; Seifert et al., 2004; and Arora and Dharwadkar., 2011 ; use only high discretionary measures as a proxy for slack to investigate levels of CSR. Navarro (1988) measures' potential slack 'as debt/equity ratio. Higher debt-to-equity ratio indicates greater financial risk, whereas the lack of liquidity will encourage governance to focus on minimizing allocation of resources to voluntary CSR. Therefore, we propose that high organizational 'potential slack' is negatively associated with voluntary CSR.
Proposition P5: Potential organisational slack is negatively associated with voluntary CSR.

The integrated voluntary CSR model
The impact of corporate governance on CSR is dependent on satisfactory firm performance 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Our propositions drawn from the literature, asserts that higher institutional and Non-CEO ownership, the majority of which is institutional shareholdings, has a more positive impact on voluntary CSR, under the condition of low slack (low leverage; low debt to equity ratio) and positive attainment discrepancy. Furthermore, the decrease of CEO shareholdings has less of a negative impact on voluntary CSR under the same conditions. Hence, [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . These 50 companies emerge from across various industries, as identified in Table 3 below:
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Social performance ratings for all the firms in our sample were collected for the period 2008-2012,in order to investigate CSR engagement during and after the U.K. recession.
In our study, the independent variables predate the dependent variable (Voluntary CSR) -a lag of one year (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) .As such, the independent variables data collection was for the period 2007-2011 5 . Data of CEOs ownership, Non-CEOs ownership, and concentrated ownership was collected from the annual publicly published reports.
Initially, the data collection was proposed using the Morningstar Company Intelligence database (formerly Hemscott Company Guru).This contains information on 300,000 British companies including their financial; share price; board of directors'; director shareholdings, remuneration, and tenure details. However, this resource was found to be less reliable for our longitudinal study i.e. it only provides a snapshot at a particular point in time, whereas we needed a continuous, consistent dataset for 2008-2012.Therefore, we engaged annual reports as substitutes despite this approach being more time consuming. Global Business Browser and BITC (Business in the Community) were additional sources for our data.
Dependent variable
This study aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on CSR. The sample was deliberately drawn from FTSE4Good U.K. Index, thereby the firms listed met the minimum rules and standards for mandatory CSR, which was therefore not under consideration. The dependent variable was voluntary CSR.
CSR indices and data sources
Archival ratings have been used as dependent CSR variables by the majority of U.S. studies typically engaging KLD 6 ratings (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011 zero. Platinum (4) indicated the highest and Not rated (0) was the lowest possible score; Table   4below shares the CSR ranking classifications adopted in this study:
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
In the next section, the independent and control variables are shared.
Independent and Control variables
The independent and control variables are identified in Table 5below . Each variable is supported by previous literature studies, and the measure in consideration of this study:
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Ownership structure (financial independent variable)
In order to identify the relationships between ownership structure and CSR ratings, three approaches were adopted. Firstly, concentrated ownership (Figure 1 above) may be the most effective mechanism of corporate governance, as financial institutions have more incentives and more means to monitor this performance (Morck et al., 1988; Kang and Sorensen, 1999; Hoskisson et al., 2002) . To test propositions P3 and P8 ( Figure 1 and Table 1 above), all institutions that owned 3 per cent or more shares in a firm (Table 4 measure Secondly, CEO stock ownership has a significant, positive impact on enhancing mandatory CSR . However, with regards to voluntary CSR, evidence suggests that the CEO acts in opposite favour (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . To test this propositions P1
and P6 (Figure 1 and Table 1 above), empirically tested CEO shareholdings, where CEO ownership was the percentage of total equity owned by CEO .
Thirdly, existing literature Ahmed and Duellman, 2007) 
Attainment discrepancy (independent variable)
To calculate attainment discrepancy in financial performance, return on assets (ROA) was calculated and used as an accounting measure of performance. This follows the approach in previous studies (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) .
After calculating the ROA, following Bromiley, (1991) and Arora and Dharwadkar, (2011) , attainment discrepancy was measured against the industry average as a benchmark. For companies that performed above the benchmark, their past performances were multiplied by 1.05 (5% increase) and the historical difference between industry and firm actual performance was represented as attainment discrepancy. Positive attainment discrepancy signified actual Figure 1 above) in our conceptual model.
Organisational potential slack (independent variable)
Different to Amato and Amato's (2007) use of financial performance to measure total slack, in this study the debt-to-equity ratio was adopted to measure 'potential' slack (Navarro, 1988; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) . However, we believe that high debt-to-equity ratio is negatively associated with long-term investments such as voluntary CSR. To test this, proposition P5, (Table 1 and Figure 1 above) was included in our conceptual model.
Control variables
This study adopted an appropriate methodology that allowed the examination of a multidimensional ownership structure of endogenous and controlling variables. The control variables in this study were firm industry, firm size, board size, CEO age, gender and tenurethose factors that have been controlled in earlier studies (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) .
Firm-industry (control variable)
There are diversified social responsibility practices across different industries Spencer and Taylor, 1987; Griffin and Mahon, 1997) . Heavy manufacturing and chemical industries are criticised for being major pollution culprits (Cole et al., 2005; Kneller and Mandersen, 2012) ; innovation fosters firm rise and decline within industry e.g. record,
cassette, CD, digital storage formats in the music industry; whilst regulations and their enforcement may drive changes in certain sectors more than others e.g. recycling, packaging, 
Firm-size (control variable)
Previous literatures (Ullman, 1985; Burke et al., 1986; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001 ) suggest that firm-size as a factor, affects firm performance including CSR and it should be controlled for. Moreover, firm-size has received more attention where there is a greater pressure on larger firms to respond to the stakeholders' demands for responsibility ). The majority of earlier studies that engage 'total assets' to measure firm-size are criticised, as this can cause statistical multicollinearity (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) . In this study, we follow the guidance to use employees' number to represent firm-size measure, which avoids such statistical problem without loss of information. Furthermore, as Firm-size can be skewed and may violate the assumption of normality (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) , therefore, in this study, the control variable has been log transformed.
CEO age and tenure (control variable)
Page 20 of 41 CEO age (McKnight et al., 2000) and tenure (Rejchrt and Higgs, 2014 ) reflect a need for experience and maturity in leadership decision-making (Korac- Kakabadse et al., 2002) , that reflects balance of CEO power and their own accountability (Kakabadse and Van den Bergh, 2013) for strategic development, particularly in high discretion environments (Kakabadse, 2015; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick et al., 1993) . As such, this study controlled for CEO age and tenure.
Board size and gender (control variable)
Influential to the implications of CEO's decision power, earlier studies (Yermack, 1997; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Brammer et al., 2007; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; FernandezFeijoo, et al., 2012; Alexandrina, 2013; Oba and Fodio, 2013) found that board size and gender have an impact and therefore we controlled for these in our study.
In the next section, the panel data approach adopted for analysis in this study is shared.
Panel data analysis
In order to avoid the biases and misleading estimates that come from traditional cross-sectional studies (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998) .this study employs panel data -the random effects model for analysis. The use of a longitudinal methodology enables this study to isolate the effects of specific actions and treatments over time and across sections (Hill and Phan, 1991; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) . In this study, the methodology is adopted to allow for the examining of the multi-dimensional ownership construct in respect of the endogenous variables and taking account of the controlling variables.
Page 21 of 41
In support of lagging the data, Hambrick (2007) asserts that when researchers include temporal lags and controls for the historical or prior states of variables, this will support the empirical establishment of causality mechanisms, closer to reality. In consideration of generalisation of findings, Maddala (2002) prefers the use of Random effects model.
The Voluntary CSR Random-effects regression model
The Random-Effects regression approach is most effective to use when the variables of interest for each firm are constant (Dougherty, 2006) . The group of firms under consideration is a random sample rather than full population (fixed) and the individual specific effects are uncorrelated (Barter, 2017; Schmidheiney, 2016) . In this case, the random-effects model is most appropriate for generalising the findings that go beyond the studied samples (Maddala, 2002) . Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis is employed using Hausman-Taylor panel data regression for endogenous covariates (Hausman and Taylor, 1981 ) -among CG, CSR and other variables used as a measure for firm performance. The equation below outlines the modelling in our study: β1,β2,β3,β4, β5,β6,β7,β8,β9,β10, andβ11 are the nonstandardised regression coefficients. The index i refers to the unit of observation (the study sample of 50 firms), t refers to the time period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , and εi,t is a disturbance term assumed to satisfy the usual regression model conditions.
VolCSRi,t = β0 + β1CEOOWNi,t-1 + β2Non-CEOOwni,t-1 + β3InstOwni,t-1 + β4AttainDisci,t-1 + β5OrgSlacki,t-1 + β6FSizei,t-1 + β7DFIi + β8CEDAgei,t-1 + β9Tenurei,t-1 + β10BoardSizei,t-1 + β11Genderi,t-1+ αi + δt + εi,t VolCSRis the dependent variable(Voluntary CSR
A trend term t has been introduced to allow for a shift of the intercept over time. If the implicit assumption of a constant rate of change seems too strong, the trend can be replaced by a set of dummy variables, one for each time period, except for the reference period (Dougherty, 2006) .
Study Findings
The means, standard deviations, and correlations are reported in 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
Where findings may be of concern due to potential multicollinearity between the variables, our regression analysis (Table 7 below) indicates no such concern, as our VIF is close to 1 (Burns and Burns, 2008 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
The findings in Tables 6 reject a null hypothesis. There is sufficient statistical evidence to conclude significant linear relationships. . The findings assert executive ownership alone may not be the solution to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Deutsch, 2005) . The above findings are analysed next in relation to the 8 propositions that were being tested in the conceptual model.
Analysis of the Voluntary CSR propositions
The results demonstrate a strong support for our propositions (Table 1 
above). Proposition 3
predicted that the increase of CEOs ownership has a negative impact on Voluntary CSR. The regression analysis ( Table 7 above) reveals that high CEO ownerships (β = -.058) has a significant negative impact on the levels of Voluntary CSR. Proposition 8 predicted that an increase in CEO shareholdings has less of a negative impact on Voluntary CSR, under conditions of low debt to equity ratio and high attainment discrepancy. Our statistical model that integrates CEO shareholdings as an element of ownership structure and behavioural theories, in order to examine the interaction effects over time (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) ) -see regression results in table 7above, strongly supports this prediction.
Proposition 2 predicted that the increase of Non-CEO ownerships has a positive impact on Voluntary CSR. Table 7 reveals that high Non-CEO ownerships (β = .010) has a highly significant impact on the levels of Voluntary CSR. Our finding here contradict studies that find a negative relationship between CSR and non-CEO ownership ( (Kesner and Johnson, 1990;  Page 25 of 41 Wang and Coffey, 1992; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) . Similarly, Proposition 1 predicted that the greater percentage of institutional ownership has a positive impact on Voluntary CSR. It is revealed in the regression analysis (Table 7 above Proposition 4 predicted that positive attainment discrepancy is associated with Voluntary CSR.
The results in Table 6 above revealed consistency with this prediction. Attainment discrepancy (β = .021) using return on assets as the accounting measure, is highly significantly associated with Voluntary CSR. 
Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this study was to understand the impact of ownership structures on corporate social responsibility of U.K. firms during government emergent austerity conditions of 2008-2012.
As such our ownership structure in conceptual modelling (Figure 1 on Voluntary CSR is more pronounced under conditions of greater attainment discrepancy (higher return on assets) and lower organizational slack (lower debt to equity ratio). We note here the longer term shift in the U.K. towards neo-liberalism that whilst enabling potential availability for established firms to raise finance, also promotes a higher risk of debt culture, which may have a psychological impact on organisational leaders. Under government austerity conditions, firm is less likely to equitably prioritise environmental and social factors above
economic. Yet, the environmental mitigation and social impacts become more important (Ajmal et al. 2017) . Looking ahead, at the potential impacts of Brexit -the U.K.'s exit from the European Union are unclear and will impact CSR policy and firm decision making as sustainable development.
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In this paper we have presented the case of CSR as a voluntary and mandatory construct. In our modelling, whilst distinguishing between the two, we assert a complimentary rather than substitution relationship. However, we argue that the substitution effect can be evident during most stable or post-crisis periods, in cases where regulation may lead to change or prevent known problems from reoccurring. In reality, voluntary CSR leads to mandatory CSR and is therefore more important, because there is a time lag and because there are differences between the practice and reporting of CSR. The need for discretionary capacity becomes more critical in handling uncertainty during periods of austerity. Mandatory CSR emerges from the learning of Voluntary CSR and then it becomes a requirement for firms in industry to comply with as standards of acceptance. There may be opportunity for more pro-active governance in shaping firm outcomes. This is an interesting discussion that will benefit from case studies and contributions.
Further studies may like to explore our results and findings in more detail. This study may also offer support to institutional policy and organisational CSR relational studies of other less developed and culturally different national frameworks or contexts (Ali, Frynas and Mahmood, 2017; Kilic, Kuzey and Uyar, 2015; Soliman, Din and Sakr, 2013:Skouloudis and Evangelinos, 2012; Dam and Scholtens, 2012; Li and Zhang, 2010; MohdGhazali, 2007; Oh, Chang and Martynov, 2011) seeking improved equity and alignment of social, environmental and economic factors for eco-sustainable development.
In conclusion, this study highlights how vital it is to integrate firm sustainability performance and leverage it in examining the impact of governance on decision making regarding long-term strategy and in our case, Voluntary CSR in particular. Our study strongly supports the need to integrate insights of the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) into corporate governance theory for determining CSR engagement (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) .Our study has drawn attention to Non-CEOs on Voluntary CSR as key to enabling conditions for better CSR engagement. Similarly, the findings call for restricting CEO financial incentivising, that do not align with longer term sustainable development strategies (such as Voluntary CSR).
Limitations
In spite of a number of methodological improvements to our research design, this study is not free of limitations. This study relies on BITC ratings that ranks only 117 U.K. firms in terms
Page 30 of 41 of philanthropic activities and local community engagements (FT, 2010) . Furthermore, those companies below 70% were given rating of 0, regardless that they maybe making contribution to Voluntary CSR. Thus, our results assume zero rating as non-engagement. Our study leans to CSR as positive, where good intentions do not necessarily mean good impact. Our study does not consider the potential for negative social impacts of CSR in the communities. Further, our selection criteria of sample firms are those that already are engaging in some kind of Voluntary CSR pro-actively. We acknowledge our data-set focuses on a time-period post-financial crisis emergent in the U.K. and is limited to CSR during recession conditions and government austerity programme.
In considering the board, our study only distinguishes between institutional, CEO and NonCEOs financially. Future studies may focus in more detail on Board members (Chairman;
Finance; NEDs) where CEO/Chairman relationship has been much researched. Essentially our study was driven by available quality data. There remains scope for better indexes and more contextually dynamic CSR and governance for improving longer term equitable economic, environmental and social sustainable development. Drucker (1984); Freeman (1984); Porter (1985) Extending the direct impacts of corporate practice responsibilities relative to impact on unique influential stakeholders.
CSR as a business opportunity; wealth creation and competitive advantage as a mechanism of power. Carroll (1979; Ethical as firm discretionary, philanthropic and corporate citizenship responsibility.
Legal, economic -firm has rule designed responsibility to society. Global sustainability reporting and enforcement. Strength of developed countries as it politically increases responsibilities of business leaders.
Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) Attainment as above aspired; Organisational slack as potential -nonfinancial performance and opportunities.
Meeting the regulations as conditional to conformance -ticking the criteria box.
Source: Designed by authors (see Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011 for Voluntary and Mandatory CSR construct). Morck et al., 1988; Kang and Sorensen, 1999; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Laidroo, 2009; Arora andDharwadkar, 2011 .
Total percentage of all institutions that own 3 per cent or more shares in the firm.
The number of full time employees.
CEOage(t-1) Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick et al, 1993; Arora andDharwadkar, 2011. Average age of CEOs and Non-CEOs.
CEOtenure(t-1) Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick et al, 1993; Arora andDharwadkar, 2011 .
The average of the number of years since CEOs and NonCEOs were appointed to the board.
Boardsize(t-1) Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al, 1998; Alexandrina, 2013. The total number of members in the board. Boardgender(t-1) Dutta and Bose, 2007; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; . Oba and Fodio, 2013 .
The ratio of females to males in the board. 
